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Despite growing concerns about pollution and climate change, first-best environmental
policies for mitigating pollution are uncommon. The first-best policies that have had polit-
ical success are typically cap-and-trade systems, or are limited both spatially and in terms
of stringency.1 Second-best policies, such as intensity standards, have gained more trac-
tion despite their shortcomings in achieving efficient outcomes. In particular, a majority of
states in the US have passed a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), which mandates that
a minimum percentage of an electricity provider’s retail sales come from renewable sources.
Complying with intensity standards like an RPS can be burdensome for firms with high
costs of clean production. In particular, electricity providers facing an RPS cannot simply
reduce non-renewable electricity because they are required to satisfy highly inelastic retail
demand. Moreover, increasing the percentage of renewables, such as wind or solar, in the
generation mix raises concerns about intermittent generation. Indeed, an RPS policy may
be a prohibitively expensive policy tool for achieving a given level of emissions reductions
(Fischer and Newell, 2008).
To help reduce compliance costs, policymakers can couple intensity standards with trad-
able credit systems, similarly to how policymakers have developed tradable permit markets
for for cap-and-trade regulation. Tradable credits allow for renewable production to be re-
allocated towards lower cost firms and actually achieves the cost-efficient outcome under
intensity targets, equating marginal costs across firms.2 Indeed, a majority of RPS states
allow for inter-state Renewable Energy Credit (REC) trading. Under REC trade, utilities
are awarded one REC for each megawatt-hour of renewable sales, and RECs can potentially
be unbundled from the energy itself. REC markets are highly active with inter-state trading
1For example, carbon taxes in the United States are only at the city or county level. A clear exception
to this is EU-ETS.
2There may be caveats in terms of what units the credits are in, see McKitrick (2001) and Holland et al.
(2009) for further details.
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volume reaching tens of millions of megawatt-hours annually. Despite the apparent bene-
fits of REC trade in terms of reducing compliance costs, there is significant heterogeneity
across states in the degree of restrictions on inter-state REC trade. Some states have taken
a lassez-faire approach to trade and place no restrictions on where a REC was generated,
while others have completely banned out-of-state RECs.3
The heterogeneity in REC trade restrictions across states is a peculiar outcome given the
economic evidence on gains from trade. Despite this tension between economic intuition and
reality, credit trading under intensity standards has yet to be the primary focus of study.4
I develop an analytical model of a jurisdictional regulator and a representative electricity
firm. The regulator sets an RPS that the firm must meet. In the model, the regulator
selects her policy instrument to address two objectives: to reduce pollution externalities
from non-renewable electricity generation, and to spur additional in-state energy from clean
and renewable sources.5 In addition to the RPS, the regulator also chooses whether or
not to allow the firm to engage in inter-jurisdictional REC trading. Using the model, I
characterize the incentives firms and regulators face under REC trade, and analyze what
drives jurisdictions to restrict firms from trading RECs.
This paper adds to a rich literature initiated by Helfand (1991) whose analysis of intensity
standards demonstrated regulating multiple polluting outputs using an intensity standard
can actually lead to increases in emissions.6 Holland et al. (2009) come to the same conclusion
3Several of the trade-eligible states, such as Delaware, are heavily reliant on out-of-state RECs, obtaining
up to 94% of the amount necessary to meet the RPS via inter-state trade in 2012. Yet other states, like Iowa
or New Mexico, restrict their utilities to obtain RECs solely from in-state generation.
4Decisions to engage in trade form a close parallel to the International Environmental Agreement literature
which analyzes incentives for countries to form coalitions for emissions reductions. See Barrett (1994) and
Karp and Simon (2013) for details on early and more recent work.
5It has been noted that the stated reasons for RPSs include development of the in-state renewable industry.
See Hollingsworth and Rudik (2015) for details.
6McKitrick (2001) analyzes an intensity standard and find that intensity standards should be heteroge-
neous across firms and stringency should be a function of firm size to achieve efficient outcomes.
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in their study of California’s low carbon fuel standard; amongst the existing literature, their
model is most similar to the one developed in this paper.7 Parallel to these results, I find a
new perverse outcome where increasing the stringency of an intensity standard can actually
reduce renewable energy generation when REC trade is allowed because of how the possibility
of REC trade alters the relationship between an RPS and its implicit renewable subsidy. This
is the first in depth analysis of trade under intensity standards that also closely matches
the characteristics of real world REC markets. Trade under intensity standards is briefly
analyzed by Holland et al. (2009), who demonstrate that trading effectively minimizes costs
subject to the market low carbon fuel standard. Similarly, McKitrick (2005) finds permit
trading under intensity standards can be efficient, as long as a permit is a unit of pollution
intensity with a specific exchange rate between firms.
Extending the existing literature, I allow for a regulator to choose both the stringency of
the intensity standard and also whether or not firms in her jurisdiction can trade credits with
extra-jurisdictional firms. Using this framework I demonstrate how credit trading changes the
regulator’s policy instrument by pinning the firm’s shadow cost to the credit price instead of it
being a function of the regulator’s RPS stringency. This alteration of the shadow cost changes
the electricity bundles that the regulator can achieve through an RPS and actually changes
the sign of the effect of RPS on renewable generation from positive to negative. In addition, I
show that whether a utility is a credit seller or credit buyer simply depends on the size of the
utility’s shadow cost compared to the credit price. Building off of this insight, the primary
result of interest is that regulators of firms that would be REC buyers if trade was allowed
(due to high relative costs of renewables or a very stringent RPS) may prefer to not engage
in credit trading as it can potentially worsen local pollution externalities beyond firm cost
7Lemoine (2013) also analyzes California’s LCFS but allows the regulator to also control the emissions
ratings for fuels in order to achieve greater welfare levels.
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reductions through trade. I also demonstrate that symmetric jurisdictions are better off by
strictly not allowing for REC trade. Standard economic intuition suggests that the regulators
of each jurisdiction should be indifferent between allowing for trade or not. However, allowing
trade does change outcomes for symmetric firms under intensity standards: in response to
opening up trade, regulators adjust their jurisdictional RPS policy to capture rents in the
REC market, shifting away from the no-trade optimal levels and reducing welfare. This
highlights how strategic responses by regulators can actually deteriorate and even completely
offset any benefits of allowing REC trade.
The paper is organized as follows. I begin by describing the firm’s problem. I then char-
acterize the determinants of REC buying and selling firms. Finally, I describe the regulators
problem and the conditions under which a jurisdiction will engage in inter-jurisdictional REC
trade.
1 A model of a firm in a competitive REC market
Suppose there is one representative price-taking firm in a jurisdiction that supplies electric-
ity to a representative consumer within that jurisdiction. The firm generates two types of
energy: renewable energy, qr, and non-renewable energy, qn.
8 The firm sells its total elec-
tricity generation, qr + qn, to the representative consumer at the retail market price P .
9
The consumer has a continuous, twice-differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave
utility function u(qr + qn) where u(0) = 0 and limqr+qn↓0 u
′(qr + qn) =∞. The cost functions
for each source of electricity, Cr(qr) and Cn(qn), are continuous, twice-differentiable, strictly
8I abstract away from intermittency. REC trade could be beneficial in smoothing out uncertain generation
from renewable plants and is a line of research left for future work.
9In a given year, retail electricity demand may be close to perfectly inelastic and the retail market price
would be effectively fixed. This does not change the results.
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increasing, and strictly convex.10
The market is regulated by a social planner who selects the level of an RPS, α, such that
α ∈ [0, 1]. The RPS mandates the minimum percentage of renewable energy in the firm’s
electricity portfolio. Without the ability to trade RECs, this constrains the firm’s electricity
generation to satisfy qr
qr+qn
≥ α.11 From herein assume that the RPS is always binding and
the regulator’s preferences (defined later) are such that the optimal α is strictly greater than
0. The firm complies with the RPS by retiring renewable energy credits (RECs). For each
unit of renewable energy generation, the firm is awarded one REC. Given total output qr+qn,
the RPS requires the firm to retire α(qr + qn) RECs. RECs are distinct commodities from
the physical renewable energy and may be bought and sold separately. If the representative
firm is able to trade RECs with other firms in a REC market, its constraint must be altered
for any trade that occurs. Let x denote the net amount of RECs a firm has sold on the REC
market. When trade is possible, the firm’s RPS constraint is now qr− x ≥ α(qr + qn). If the
firm is a net REC seller (x > 0), its remaining quantity of RECs, qr − x, must be weakly
larger than the amount it’s required to retire to maintain compliance: α(qr + qn). If the firm
is a net buyer of RECs (x < 0), the amount of RECs the firm earned from its renewable
energy generation, qr, may be lower than the quantity of RECs it must retire, α(qr + qn),
due to the additional RECs the firm purchased, −x.
In reality, many states impose inter-state trading restrictions on electric utilties. To
mathematically capture the regulator’s choice to engage in credit trade, I introduce trading
ratios. If the firm is a seller in a REC market, its trading ratio, βs ∈ [0, 1] requires the firm
10The majority of the renewable power sold by utilities is bought from independent power producers
(Fremeth and Shaver, 2014). In this static setting we can think of the firm as a utility who contracts with
the cheapest independent producers first in order to meet renewable energy needs.
11Technically RPS regulate a utility’s electricity sales, but in this stylized model we use them interchange-
ably.
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to sell 1
βs
RECs to obtain REC revenues of ξ. This implies that the effective REC price the
REC selling firm faces is βsξ ≤ ξ. For a firm potentially buying RECs, the trading ratio
βb ∈ [0, 1] determines what fraction of a REC purchased at price ξ can be used towards
the RPS. For a buyer, the effective price for one REC is ξ
βb
≥ ξ. Both trading ratios are
parameters that I will use to perform comparative statics and welfare analysis for REC trade.
If a firm’s trading ratio is zero, it is not in a REC market: a sold REC obtains a price of 0
when βs = 0, and a purchased REC will not count towards the RPS if βb = 0. If the trading
ratios are equal to unity, then a REC sold returns the full market price ξ and the full amount
of a purchased REC may be used toward the RPS.
Assuming the firm is a price taker in both the electricity and REC markets, the firm
solves one of the following problems:
max
qr,qn,x
P [qr + qn]− Cr(qr)− Cn(qn) + βsξx (1)
subject to:
qr − x
qr + qn
≥ α
max
qr,qn,x
P [qr + qn]− Cr(qr)− Cn(qn) + ξx (2)
subject to:
qr − βbx
qr + qn
≥ α
Where equation (1) is the REC selling firm’s problem and equation (2) is the REC buying
firm’s problem. Given an interior solution, the optimal quantities for each type of energy,
and RECs sold, are governed by the first-order conditions for electricity generation, and a
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buyer or seller specific first order condition for REC trade,
P − C ′r(q∗r) + λ∗(1− α) = 0 (3)
P − C ′n(q∗n)− λ∗α = 0 (4)
Seller: βsξ − λ∗ = 0, Buyer: ξ − λ∗βb = 0. (5)
Primes indicate derivatives and λ∗ is the non-negative equilibrium shadow cost of the con-
straint. The retail electricity market clears with P = u′(q∗r +q
∗
n), assuming that the two types
of generation are perfect substitutes under the representative consumer’s preferences.12
The outcome of using an RPS policy is the simultaneous subsidization of renewables by
λ∗(1− α) and taxation of non-renewables by λ∗α. Increased RPS stringency has two effects
on the implicit renewable subsidy. The direct effect (1−α) tends to reduce the subsidy due to
a higher RPS discouraging overall generation. Each additional unit of renewable generation
affords the firm the ability to generate an additional 1−α
α
qr units of non-renewable generation
while maintaining compliance with the RPS. As the RPS becomes more stringent, a unit
of renewable generation allows fewer units of non-renewables to be generated while still
satisfying the constraint, reducing the marginal benefit of renewables. The shadow effect of
the policy, λ∗, increases the subsidy and stems from a higher RPS requiring the firm have
a larger proportion of renewables in the electricity mix, increasing the marginal benefit of
renewables. For more stringent RPS policies, the implicit non-renewable tax increases as
both effects tend to make non-renewables more costly.
The third first-order condition captures the marginal cost and benefit of REC sales or
purchases. A REC selling firm obtains marginal revenues of βsξ, however selling one more
12In reality this may not be true. For example, consumers can contract to specifically purchase renewable
energy under a mandatory green power option.
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unit carries a cost λ∗ due to the firm having to either increase renewables, decrease non-
renewables, or some combination of both, to continue meeting the constraint. If βs = 0,
the marginal cost of selling RECs, λ∗, is always greater than the marginal revenue, βsξ = 0,
inducing a corner solution where x∗ = 0 since x∗ must be weakly positive for a REC seller.
This effectively reduces the problem to a firm that is not allow to trade RECs. As βs
increases, the firm obtains a greater price for each REC sold until βs = 1 where the firm
receives ξ for one REC. For a buyer, the marginal cost of buying a REC is ξ and the marginal
benefit is λ∗βb. When βb = 0 any REC purchased does not count towards the RPS so the
marginal benefit of buying a REC is zero, again inducing a corner solution of x∗ = 0 and
mapping into a scenario with no REC trade allowed. Higher βb increases the proportion of
a purchased REC that counts towards meeting the RPS, increasing the marginal benefit of
buying a REC until βb = 1 where each REC purchased counts fully towards RPS compliance.
Performing comparative statics with the two trading ratios will allow us to determine the
effects of allowing credit trade on firm decisions and welfare. If the comparative statics
are strictly positive or negative we have a sufficient condition for how REC trade affects
outcomes.
1.1 The changing effect of RPSs under trade
The shadow cost captures the firm’s benefit of marginally weakening the RPS constraint,
or equivalently, it is the value of receiving an additional REC. When fully joining a REC
market, i.e. βb = βs = 1, the shadow and direct effects of the RPS still remain, but the value
of a REC towards the firm, the shadow cost λ, is pinned to the market price as shown in
equation (5). This introduces a third effect of the RPS policy, called the REC effect. The
appendix shows this precisely offsets the shadow effect, changing how the RPS affects the
8
Ivan Rudik Tradable Credit Markets for Intensity Standards February 2, 2016
𝝀
𝜶
𝝀𝑵𝑻(𝜶)
𝝃
Figure 1: Relationship between RPS level and shadow cost
firm’s optimal generation levels. This change is illustrated in Figure 1. Prior to joining the
REC market, the regulator simultaneously selected the RPS level α and the shadow cost of
the constraint λNT (α), resulting in an upward sloping curve of possible (α, λNT (α)) selections,
where subscript NT indicates no trade. When a REC market is joined, the shadow effect
vanishes due to the offsetting REC effect, therefore the regulator can no longer influence the
shadow cost and can now only select α while λ is pinned to ξ.
Pinning the shadow cost changes the regulator’s feasible (α, λ(α)) choice set and therefore
changes the tax-subsidy combinations possible with RPS instrument. As we move to the
northwest, the renewable subsidy unambiguously increases since the shadow effect grows
and the direct effect declines. Moving to the northeast unambiguously increases the non-
renewable tax by amplifying both the shadow and direct effects. Moving to the northeast
or southwest on the graph pushes the shadow and direct effect in opposite directs so the
9
Ivan Rudik Tradable Credit Markets for Intensity Standards February 2, 2016
net effect on the implicit renewable subsidy is ambiguous. Since λ(α) has positive slope,
increasing the RPS moves us along the northeast-southwest dimension. So a change in the
RPS without REC trade will lead to an ambiguous effect on renewable generation. However,
when λ is pinned at ξ by the REC market, the regulator can only move left or right on the
graph. In this case, increasing the RPS unambiguously reduces the subsidy and decreases
renewable output.
So far we have assumed the REC price is fixed for tractability, but in reality the REC
price is endogenous. The appendix shows that, under quadratic utility and quadratic costs,
the REC price is just a weighted average of the shadow costs of each firm’s RPS constraint
when it is not allowed to trade RECs.13 Effectively, the REC market introduces a global
intensity standard over the entire market.14 With this intuition, the representative firm
of a jurisdiction can potentially represent multiple firms within that jurisdiction, with the
possibility of intra-jurisdictional REC trade. When βb = βs = 0, the shadow cost of the
representative firm of the jurisdiction is just the price that clears the REC market within
the jurisdiction. Since all firms face the same RPS, and the representative firm’s output is
just the aggregate of the represented firms.
1.2 Determinants of buyers and sellers
The difference between the shadow cost of a firm’s RPS constraint without trade, λNT , and
the REC price, ξ, will be the determining factor in whether a firm buys or sells RECs.
Suppose that a jurisdiction joins a REC market, the jurisdiction’s RPS is held constant, and
13The weights are given by the ratio of the determinant of the Hessian to the firm’s maximization problem
when unconstrained by an RPS, to the determinant of the Hessian to the firm’s maximization problem when
facing an RPS.
14This is different from the market LCFS in Holland et al. (2009) where each firm faces the same explicit
LCFS. Here, each firm can be facing a different RPS but the REC price gives us the shadow cost of the
weighted average of all RPS.
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ξ > λNT so that the REC price is larger than the firm’s no-trade shadow cost. The last
condition implies the implied global RPS policy of the REC market is more stringent, i.e.
has a larger shadow cost, than the RPS policy of the joining jurisdiction. When making
generation decisions, firms act as if they are facing the implicit global RPS, since the third
first-order condition pins the shadow cost to the REC price. Since the implicit global RPS is
more stringent, this shifts the firm’s generation mix to be more renewable dominant than if it
were facing the weaker jurisdictional RPS. Yet, the firm does not need to retire RECs to meet
the implied global policy, but only needs to retire enough RECs to satisfy the jurisdictional
RPS. In this case the firm has excess RECs and sells them on the REC market. If ξ < λNT ,
the global RPS policy is less stringent than the jurisdictional policy, pinning the shadow cost
at a lower value than without REC trade. The firm responds to this change by reducing
renewables and increasing non-renewables. But, the firm’s generation portfolio no longer
has a large enough proportion of renewables to satisfy the regulator’s RPS. To maintain
compliance, the firm must purchase RECs.
Figures 2 and 3 give graphical intuition for the distinction between REC buying and
REC selling firms, and how optimal REC trade links back into firm profits. Figure 2 shows
the firm’s iso-profit curves for electricity sales, graphed as ovals. The iso-profit curves do
not include REC revenues or costs, and profit is increasing as the generation bundles move
inward towards the center point of the iso-profit curves. The RPS is an upward sloping line
that passes through the origin in the case with no REC trade, and it restricts the firms
output choice set to be up and to the left of the line. The regulator sets an RPS to shift
the firm’s generation bundle closer to the social optimum, which under the assumption of a
binding constraint, falls somewhere above or to the left of the of the firm’s profit maximizing
bundle.
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Figure 2: Firm iso-profit curves, net of REC revenues/costs
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Figure 3: Profit net of REC revenues/costs as a function of RECs sold
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Let the middle RPS line be some arbitrary RPS with no REC trade. Then point a is
the firms optimal bundle when it is not able to trade RECs (x = 0) since it achieves the
highest iso-profit curve amongst the generation bundles in the firm’s choice set. Suppose the
regulator allows the firm to trade RECs at a trading ratio of 1, and for simplicity, maintains
the same RPS. Notice that a binding RPS constraint can be rewritten as qr =
αqn+x
1−α . REC
purchases or sales vertically shift the RPS constraint. If the firm is a buyer in the REC
market, it incurs a cost ξx. REC purchases (−x) shift the RPS constraint downward by
x
1−α , allowing the firm to move up its iso-profit curves to point b. Recall that REC costs are
not included in the curves so the iso-profit curves do not move or change shape. Conversely,
when a firm sells RECs, it gains REC revenues ξx but its choice set becomes more restricted
since the RPS shifts upward by x
1−α . The firm moves down its iso-profit curves to point c.
How the firm selects its optimal REC trading quantity is determined by a simple relation
of the marginal benefits and marginal costs of REC trade. Figure 3 graphs pi(x), the firm’s
equilibrium profit, excluding REC revenues and costs, as a function of x. pi(x) is the curve
that would trace out points a, b and c in Figure 2 as the firm changes its quantity of RECs
traded. −dpi(x)
dx
is also graphed and is an increasing function of x since another unit of REC
sales requires the firm to shift its generation mix to be more renewable dominant, increasing
generation costs and reducing profits. Finally, the firm’s shadow cost without trade, λNT is
graphed as a horizontal line along with two potential REC prices: ξHI > λNT and ξLO < λNT .
The firm’s optimal level of REC trade equates the marginal costs and benefits of buying or
selling RECs. If the firm is selling RECs, it gets marginal revenues equal to ξ and incurs
marginal costs equal to dpi
dx
from having to re-optimize electricity generation to be more
renewable dominant in order to maintain compliance with the RPS. This is the profit loss
from shifting up the RPS as in Figure 2. If the firm is buying RECs, the source of marginal
13
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costs and benefits reverse. The firm pays ξ per unit of RECs to shift the RPS down in
order to allow a generation bundle closer to the unconstrained optimum so that it receives
a marginal profit gain of dpi
dx
.
The optimal level of REC trade is where −dpi(x)
dx
equals the REC price for both buyers
and sellers. If the REC price and dpi
dx
curves intersect to the right of xNT = 0, the firm is
a REC seller. If the curves intersect to the left of xNT , the firm is a REC buyer. Recall
that the shadow cost of the RPS constraint is the marginal benefit to the firm of marginally
weakening the RPS, so without REC trade we have: −dpi(x)
dx
= λNT . When the RPS is
binding, λNT must be the value which forces x to zero. If the REC price is different from
λNT , the intersection of −dpi(x)dx and the REC price will be at some non-zero level of REC
trade. The quadrant where the negative marginal profit curve intersects the REC price is
completely determined by the relative magnitudes of the REC price and λNT . If ξ > λNT
such as ξHI , then the intersection of the marginal curves is always to the right of xNT and
the firm sells RECs, following the intuition outlined above. If ξ < λNOREC like ξLO, the
intersection is to the left of xNT and the firm buys RECs.
2 The regulator’s problem: RPS and REC trading de-
cisions
For clarity, consider the regulator’s problem in terms of setting an RPS conditional on a given
trading ratio, or selecting the trading ratio conditional on a pre-determined RPS, but not
both simultaneously. I consider both possible ways to order decisionmaking and show that
there is a non-trivial difference in outcomes, suggesting that the timing regulators’ decisions
on REC trade restrictions is critical for firm behavior and welfare outcomes. The regulator’s
14
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objective is to maximize the social welfare of its jurisdiction. Social welfare is the sum of
consumption utility minus the cost of purchasing electricity from the firm, firm profits, and
two externalities from electricity generation. The first externality is pollution damages from
non-renewable generation. The marginal damage from one unit of non-renewable generation
is determined by the damage factor τ . I assume the REC market is sufficiently large so that
aggregate output of other firms in the REC market does not change in response to the mod-
eled jurisdiction joining the market so damages of outside, unmodeled firms do not enter the
regulator’s welfare problem. Alternatively, the regulator takes the REC price as given or may
only be concerned with local emissions. The second externality is “green welfare,” a benefit
from renewable generation above and beyond offsetting dirty non-renewable electricity. An
additional unit of renewable generation provides social welfare g. The positive renewable
externality may be driven by green preferences of constituents, or a desire to promote “green
jobs.” It does not necessarily have to provide real welfare in terms of dollars, but captures
non-monetary reasons why a jurisdiction may wish to pass an RPS. First, I analyze regulator
policy behavior conditional on being in a REC market. The regulator’s problem is,
max
α
u(qr + qn)− Cr(qr)− Cn(qn) + g qr − τqn + βsξx, (6)
where βs is omitted if the representative firm is a potential REC buyer, and βb does not
explicitly enter the regulator’s objective.15 The welfare-maximizing RPS solves the regulators
15Recall βb is inside of the firm’s RPS constraint, so qr and qn are both functions of βb.
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first-order condition:
u′ (qn(α∗) + qr(α∗))
[
∂qn(α
∗)
∂α
+
∂qr(α
∗)
∂α
]
− C ′r(qr(α∗))
∂qr(α
∗)
∂α
− C ′n(qn(α∗))
∂qn(α
∗)
∂α
+g
∂qr(α
∗)
∂α
− τ ∂qn(α
∗)
∂α
+ βsξ
∂x(α∗)
∂α
= 0 (7)
After substituting in the firms first-order conditions which determine optimal responses to
policy, we have that in equilibrium,
g
∂qr(α
∗)
∂α
− τ ∂qn(α
∗)
∂α
= λ(α∗)(1− α∗)∂qr(α
∗)
∂α
− λ(α∗)α∗∂qn(α
∗)
∂α
− βsξ ∂x(α
∗)
∂α
(8)
The left hand side is the net marginal externality benefits of a more stringent RPS and the
right hand side is the net marginal costs to the firm. Using this equilibrium condition, we
can obtain several key results regarding the regulator’s RPS level.
Proposition 1.
1. α is increasing in τ .
2. Suppose βs = βb = 0. If the shadow effect (direct effect) dominates, α increases
(decreases) in g.
3. If βs = βb = 1, then qr always decreases in α.
Proof. See appendix.
The appendix shows that non-renewable output is always declining in RPS stringency
because a higher RPS increases the implicit tax on non-renewables. Since greater τ leads to
lower welfare, the regulator will increase RPS stringency to reduce damages.
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If βs = βb = 0, the firm is not able to trade RECs. Recall that an RPS has two effects
on generation decisions: the shadow effect which increases the difficulty of meeting the RPS
constraint, and the direct effect which reduces how many units of non-renewables that are
offset by a unit of renewables.16 If the shadow effect dominates the direct effect, higher RPS
lead to more renewable generation. However it is possible that a higher RPS may lead to less
renewable generation. Therefore, if the marginal social benefit of renewables is sufficiently
high, the regulator may actually be better off setting a lower RPS or no RPS at all.
Counter-intuitively, if βs = βb = 1, firms decrease renewable generation in response to a
more stringent RPS. Recall that under trade there is a third effect, the REC effect, which
precisely offsets the shadow effect. This captures the shadow cost being pinned down by the
exogenous REC price, resulting in strictly lower renewable subsidies under higher RPS, and
therefore lower renewable generation. Indeed, a lower RPS increases the marginal benefit
of renewables by allowing the firm to reap higher REC-related profits for any given level of
non-renewable generation.
Corollary 2.
If βs = βb = 1, then α always decreases in g.
Proof. See appendix.
As a result of this counter-intuitive response to policy, regulators actually set weaker
RPSs under REC trade when their jurisdiction has stronger green preferences.
16Or alternatively, the direct effect increases the opportunity cost of non-renewables by requiring more
renewables to be generated for each unit to meet the RPS.
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2.1 Joining decision with a fixed RPS
Thus far I have outlined firm behavior and the regulator’s RPS adjustments in response to
joining a REC market. Now I investigate under what conditions a regulator will decide to
engage in REC trade conditional on their RPS. First I analyze a setting where a regulator
has previously set an RPS and is deciding on engaging in REC trade and a special case of a
second setting where the regulator decides on engaging in trade and then sets the RPS level
conditional on her REC trade decision.
A regulator joins a REC market if and only if social welfare will increase in its jurisdiction.
Let ∆W be the change in welfare from joining a REC market conditional on having previously
set some RPS α. ∆W can be decomposed into four parts: [1] the change in welfare from
externalities, [2] the change in consumer welfare, [3] the change in firm profits net of REC
revenue, [4] and the change in REC revenues:
∆W =
[
g
(
qJr − qDr
)− τ (qJn − qDn )]+ [(u (qJr + qJn)− P (qJr + qJn))− (u (qDr + qDn )− P (qDr + qDn ))]
+
(
piJ − piD)+ ξ [(1− α) qJr − αqJn] (9)
where J indicates optimal quantities conditional on the regulator joining a REC market, D
indicates optimal quantities conditional on the regulator not joining a REC market, and pi is
equilibrium firm profit net of REC revenues: P (qr + qn)−Cr(qr)−Cn(qn). All quantities are
at their equilibrium levels but stars are omitted for notational clarity. The first bracketed
term is the change in externality welfare, the second is the change in consumer welfare, the
third is the change in firm profits and the last term is REC revenues or costs. We can sign
∆W by analyzing the regulator’s first-order condition for the trading ratio. If the first-order
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condition is always positive regardless of the value of the trading ratio, we have a corner
solution and the trading ratio is set to 1. However if the first-order condition is always
negative then the trading ratio will be set to 0 at the other possible corner solution.
Proposition 3. If the REC price, ξ, is larger than the shadow cost the firm faces without
trade, λNT , then the regulator will set βs = 1 (i.e. join a REC market).
Proof. See appendix.
ξ > λNT implies the firm is a REC seller if trade is allowed. Consider the regulator’s
joining decision assuming she will not be able to change the RPS after she makes her joining
decision. The appendix shows that since the firm is a REC seller, the firm’s renewable gener-
ation increases and non-renewable generation decreases upon allowing REC trade, improving
both externalities. Since the RPS is fixed and the firm is free to reoptimize across electricity
types, the firm can weakly reduce costs and is weakly better off compared to not trading,
and this gain dominates any potential utility loss to consumers. Therefore, welfare strictly
increases when the RPS is fixed so welfare will also improve even when the RPS restriction is
relaxed. The regulator will only adjust the RPS to improve welfare further, so the regulator
always joins a REC market if the firm will be a REC seller.
Corollary 4. If the REC price, ξ, is smaller than the shadow cost the firm faces without
trade, λNT , then the regulator selects an interior trading ratio.
Proof. See appendix.
For the regulator of a REC buying firm, there no corner solution where selecting β∗b = 1
or β=b 0. Since interior trading ratios are an artifact of the model, it’s unclear whether βb = 1
or βb = 0 achieves greater welfare. I next show a special case where there may actually be
no trade.
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2.1.1 Special case: Symmetric jurisdictions
Consider a special case where all jurisdictions are symmetric and regulators simultaneous
choose the RPS and their trading ratio. Under a conventional cap and trade policy, the
decision to allow firms to engage in trade has no influence on jurisdictional or global welfare.
However, with credit trading under intensity standards this will not be true.
Proposition 5. Suppose the REC price is exogenous. A REC market of an arbitrary number
of identical jurisdictions makes all jurisdictions strictly worse off if ∂xi
∂αi
6= 0 for all jurisdic-
tions i in the REC market.
Proof. See appendix.
A common necessary condition for trade is heterogeneity in production costs or prefer-
ences. Otherwise, no trade occurs, the outcome is identical to when trade was forbidden, and
the REC price will be equivalent to the symmetric shadow cost of each jurisdiction’s RPS
constraint. However, when regulation is localized, regulators have an incentive to capture
REC rents by lowering their RPS after opening up REC trade. For example, if a regulator
weakens its RPS, its representative firm will increase renewables as shown in the appendix.
This increases green welfare within the jurisdiction, and increases firm profits by weakening
the RPS constraint and allowing the firm to sell its excess RECs (or purchase fewer RECs)
on the market. Pollution also unambiguously increases as the implicit non-renewable tax
decreases. Yet, all firms are symmetric, so even though regulators have adjusted their RPS to
capture rents, they obtain none of them since there cannot possibly be trade. This leaves the
regulators’ RPSs strictly different from the optimal level given no REC trade, incentivizing
generation levels that strictly different from the no-trade socially optimal levels.
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3 Discussion
Within several years RPS will be in full force in a majority of states in the US. Although
there’s a vast literature on trading schemes under a conventional quantity standard, existing
research on trading under intensity standards, and inter-jurisdictional trade is sparse. I find
that whether a firm buys or sells RECs in a REC market is driven by the relationship of its
shadow cost to the market shadow cost, the REC price. Moreover, joining a REC market
changes the set of social outcomes achievable by the regulator due to the REC market pinning
down the shadow cost. A more stringent internal shadow cost leads firms to be REC buyers
while a more lenient shadow cost induces REC selling. I find that REC selling jurisdictions
will always improve by engaging in trade, however, REC buyers face worsening externalities
from trade and the welfare implications of trade are ambiguous. These results suggest that
decisions by state regulators to restrict inter-state REC trade may in fact be locally optimal.
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A Lemmas for the main results
There are several lemmas required before proving the propositions.
Lemma 6. There exists a unique maximum.
Proof. Form the bordered Hessian for a REC seller:
Hfirm =

0 −(1− α) α 1
−(1− α) u′′ − C ′′r u′′ 0
α u′′ u′′ − C ′′n 0
1 0 0 0

(10)
We must show the upper-left justified 3x3 matrix has a positive determinant and that
the determinant of the entire Hessian is negative for the Hessian to be negative-definite and
existence of a unique maximum. The 3x3 matrix’s determinant is:
(1− α) [−(1− α)(u′′ − C ′′n)− u′′α] + α [−(1− α)u′′ − α(u′′ − C ′′r )] > 0 (11)
The determinant of the Hessian is:
u′′2 − (u′′ − C ′′r )(u′′ − C ′′n) < 0 (12)
For a buyer, replace elements (4,1) and (1,4) in the matrix with βb. The determinant
of the upper left justified 3x3 matrix is the same. The determinant of the entire Hessian is
the seller’s determinant multiplied by β2b which is still weakly positive. In the case where
βb equals zero precisely, we construct the 3x3 Hessian where trade is strictly not allow and
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obtain conditions for a unique maximum.
Lemma 7. qn is decreasing in α. If the trading ratios are 1, qr is decreasing in α. If the
trading ratios are zero for the seller, or less than 1 for the buyer, qr is decreasing in α if the
shadow effect dominates the direct effect. The quantity of RECs sold may be increasing or
decreasing in α.
For a seller the comparative statics for each output are proportional to the Hessian where
the column mapping to that output is replaced by a vector of derivatives of the first-order
conditions and constraint with respect to the parameter being varied.
If the trading ratio is zero, the selling firm’s problem reduces to attempting to satisfy the
RPS without trade. The Hessian for the no-trade case is:
Hnotrade =

0 (1− α) −α
(1− α) u′′ − C ′′r u′′
−α u′′ u′′ − C ′′n
 , (13)
which is positive following lemma 6. The upper left justified 2x2 matrix is clearly negative
so by the second derivative condition there exists a unique maximum. Next I derive the
comparative statics for the firm without trade beginning with renewables,
∂qr
∂α
∝ −
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 −(qr + qn) −α
(1− α) ∂λ
∂α
(1− α)− λ u′′
−α − ∂λ
∂α
α− λ u′′ − C ′′n
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= (qr + qn) [(1− α)C ′′n − u′′]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Shadow effect
+ −αλ︸︷︷︸
Direct effect
(14)
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where the shadow effect is positive and the direct effect is negative so the net effect is
ambiguous. The non-renewable response is proportional to:
∂qn
∂α
∝ −
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 (1− α) −(qr + qn)
(1− α) u′′ − C ′′r ∂λ∂α(1− α)− λ
−α u′′ − ∂λ
∂α
α− λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= − [λ (1− α) + (qr + qn) [αC ′′r − u′′]] ≤ 0 (15)
Suppose the trading ratio βs is non-zero. The non-renewable response to a marginal change
in the RPS for a REC seller is,
∂qr
∂α
∝
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 qr + qn α 1
−(1− α) ∂λ
∂α
(1− α)− λ u′′ 0
α ∂λ
∂α
(−α)− λ u′′ − C ′′n 0
1 − ∂λ
∂α
0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −λC ′′n︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct effect
− ∂λ
∂α
[u′′ − (1− α)C ′′n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Shadow effect
+
∂λ
∂α
[u′′ − (1− α)C ′′n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
REC effect
= −λC ′′n < 0 (16)
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Similarly for non-renewables,
∂qn
∂α
∝
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 −(1− α) qr + qn 1
−(1− α) u′′ − C ′′r ∂λ∂α(1− α)− λ 0
α u′′ ∂λ
∂α
(−α)− λ 0
1 0 − ∂λ
∂α
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −
[
λC ′′r −
∂λ
∂α
(u′′ − (1− α)C ′′r )
]
− ∂λ
∂α
[u′′ − (1− α)C ′′n]
= −λC ′′r < 0 (17)
Suppose βb is non-zero. The comparative statics for a REC buyer are,
∂qr
∂α
∝
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 qr + qn α βb
−(1− α) ∂λ
∂α
(1− α)− λ u′′ 0
α ∂λ
∂α
(−α)− λ u′′ − C ′′n 0
βb −βb ∂λ∂α 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∝ −λC ′′n︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct effect
− ∂λ
∂α
[u′′ − (1− α)C ′′n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Shadow effect
+
∂λ
∂α
[u′′ − (1− α)C ′′n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
REC effect
= −λC ′′n < 0 (18)
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and,
∂qn
∂α
∝
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 −(1− α) qr + qn βb
−(1− α) u′′ − C ′′r ∂λ∂α(1− α)− λ 0
α u′′ ∂λ
∂α
(−α)− λ 0
βb 0 −βb ∂λ∂α 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −λC ′′r < 0 (19)
Lemma 8. For a seller, qr is increasing in βs and qn is decreasing in βs. For a buyer, qr
decreases and qn increases in βb
∂qr
∂βs
∝
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 α 1
−(1− α) (1− α) ∂λ
∂βs
u′′ 0
α −α ∂λ
∂βs
u′′ − C ′′n 0
1 ξ − ∂λ
∂βs
0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −ξ[u′′ − (1− α)C ′′n] > 0 (20)
∂qn
∂βs
∝
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 −(1− α) 0 1
−(1− α) u′′ − C ′′r (1− α) ∂λ∂βs 0
α u′′ −α ∂λ
∂βs
0
1 0 ξ − ∂λ
∂βs
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= ξ(u′′ − αC ′′r ) < 0 (21)
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∂qr
∂βb
∝
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 α 1
−(1− α) (1− α) ∂λ
∂βb
u′′ 0
α −α ∂λ
∂βb
u′′ − C ′′n 0
1 −λ− βb ∂λ∂βb 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= [λ+ (βb − 1) ∂λ
∂βb
][u′′ − (1− α)C ′′n] < 0 (22)
∂qn
∂βb
∝
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 −(1− α) 0 1
−(1− α) u′′ − C ′′r (1− α) ∂λ∂βb 0
α u′′ −α ∂λ
∂βb
0
1 0 −λ− βb ∂λ∂βb 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −[λ+ (βb − 1) ∂λ
∂βb
](u′′ − αC ′′r ) > 0 (23)
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Assume the regulator’s problem is strictly concave in α. By the implicit function theorem
we have that ∂α
∂τ
∝ −∂qn
∂α
> 0 and ∂α
∂g
∝ ∂qr
∂α
. If βs = 0 for a REC seller and βb = 0 for a REC
buyer, the renewable comparative static is positive (negative) if the shadow effect (direct
effect) dominates. If βs and βb are 1, the renewable comparative static is negative. This is
shown in Lemma 7.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 3 and Corollary 4
Note that x = (1− α)qr − αqn when the RPS binds. I drop the arguments for the functions
and the equlibrium selections of qr and qn. First, hold the RPS fixed at some level α
f . Then
the FOC that governs the regulator’s joining decision when the RPS is held constant is,
∂W ∗
∂β∗s
= (u′ − C ′r + β∗sξ(1− αf ))
∂q∗r
∂β∗s
+ (u′ − C ′n − β∗sξαf )
∂q∗n
∂β∗s
+ g
∂q∗r
∂β∗s
− τ ∂q
∗
n
∂β∗s
. (24)
The first two terms in parentheses are the firm’s first-order conditions for generation after
substituting in for λ∗ using the first-order condition for REC trade. These are zero in
equilibrium. The last two externality terms are always positive as shown in Lemma 8,
therefore the regulator’s first order condition is strictly greater than zero. This results in a
corner solution of βs = 1. If the regulator always sets β
∗
s = 1 for any given α
f , then the
regulator will join if able to select α herself.
The first order condition for the regulator after substituting in the REC buying firm’s
first order conditions is,
∂W ∗
∂βb
= g
∂qr
∂β∗b
− τ ∂qn
∂β∗b
+ ξ(1− α)
[
1− 1
βb
]
∂qr
∂βb
− ξα
[
1− 1
βb
]
∂qn
∂βb
(25)
The first two terms are negative and the last two terms are positive. If βb = 1 then the
first-order condition is negative, which, in a complementarity problem, implies that βb = 0:
a contradiction. However if βb → 0 then the first order condition goes to infinity, and due
to the nature of a complementarity problem, implies that βb = 1: another contradiction.
Therefore the regulator of a REC buying firm selects an interior trading ratio.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose all jurisdictions are symmetric. The optimality condition for an arbitrary regulator
governing a firm that cannot trade is,
∂W
∂α∗
= (u′ − C ′r + g)
∂qr
∂α∗
+ (u′ − C ′n − τ)
∂qn
∂α∗
= 0 (26)
When trade is allowed, the condition changes to:
∂W
∂α+
= (u′ − C ′r + g)
∂qri
∂α+i
+ (u′ − C ′n − τ)
∂qni
∂α+i
−
∑
j 6=i
τ
∂qnj
∂ξ
∂ξ
∂α+i
+
∂xi
∂α+i
ξ + xi
∂ξ
∂α+i
= 0
(27)
Where j indicates all other firms. Since all jurisdictions are symmetric and regulators act
simultaneously, their actions will also be symmetric. Therefore, in equilibrium, there will be
no trade. However, α∗ is the unique no-trade optimal RPS. Therefore if
−
∑
j 6=i
τ
∂qnj
∂ξ
∂ξ
∂α+i
+
∂xi
∂α+i
ξ + xi
∂ξ
∂α+i
6= 0, (28)
then α+ 6= α∗. If the REC price is exogenous, i.e. fixed, the first and third terms in
equation (28) are zero. Applying the derivative, the second term is zero only when (1 −
α) ∂qr
∂α+i
− α ∂qn
∂α+i
= qr + qn. If this is non-zero, then α
+ 6= α∗ and welfare is strictly lower with
trade with an exogenous REC price.
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A.4 Derivation of a Global RPS Under Quadratic Utility and
Costs
A.4.1 The Firm’s Problem Without REC Trade
To maintain clarity in this section I move the subscripts that indicate electricity type to be
superscripts and change notation to explicitly show the partial derivatives. Consider utility
i’s profit-maximization problem when trade is not allowed,
max
qri ,q
n
i
Pi · (qri + qni )− Cri (qri )− Cni (qni ) (29)
subject to:
qri
qri + q
n
i
≥ αi (30)
The first order conditions that govern the optimal quantities of each type of electricity are,
∂ui(q
r
i + q
n
i )
∂qri
− ∂C
r
i (q
r
i )
∂qri
+ λi(1− αi) = 0 (31)
∂ui(q
r
i + q
n
i )
∂qni
− ∂C
n
i (q
n
i )
∂qni
− λi αi = 0, (32)
where λi is the positive shadow cost of the constraint. Form the bordered Hessian for utility
i,
Hi =

∂2ui(q
r
i +q
n
i )
(∂qri )
2 − ∂
2Cri (q
r
i )
(∂qri )
2
∂2ui(q
r
i +q
n
i )
∂qni ∂q
r
i
1− αi
∂2ui(q
r
i +q
n
i )
∂qri ∂q
n
i
∂2ui(q
r
i +q
n
i )
(∂qni )
2 − ∂
2Cni (q
n
i )
(∂qni )
2 −αi
1− αi −αi 0
 (33)
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Using Schwarz’ theorem, the determinant of the bordered Hessian is,
−
[
(1− αi)
(
∂2ui(q
r
i + q
n
i )
∂qni ∂q
r
i
− (1− αi)∂
2Cni (q
n
i )
(∂qni )
2
)
+ αi
(
∂2ui(q
r
i + q
n
i )
∂qni ∂q
r
i
− αi∂
2Cri (q
r
i )
(∂qri )
2
)]
> 0
(34)
At a global maximum, |Hi| must have the same sign as (−1)N where N is the number of
first order conditions. This system satisfies this condition with N = 2.
A.5 Derivation of REC price under quadratic utility and costs
In equilibrium, the first order conditions are satisfied for each firm i, along with the market
clearing condition. The Jacobian of this system of 2N+1 equations forms the bordered Hes-
sian for the system of firm profit maximization problems. Re-write the utility and cost func-
tions using the assumption that all firms’ utility functions and cost functions are quadratic:
∂ui(q
r
i + q
n
i )
∂qri
=
∂ui(q
r
i + q
n
i )
∂qni
= u1i+u
2
i (q
r
i+q
n
i )
∂Cri (q
r
i )
∂qri
= r1i+r
2
i q
r
i
∂Cni (q
n
i )
∂qni
= n1+n2qni ,
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where u1i , u
2
i , r
1
i , r
2
i , n
1
i , n
2
i ∈ R for all firms i. The system of 2N + 1 first order conditions
that govern the N state equilibrium can be written as:

u21 − r21 u21 0 0 ... 0 0 1− α1
u21 u
2
1 − n21 0 0 ... 0 0 −α1
0 0 u21 − r22 u22 ... 0 0 1− α2
0 0 u21 u
2
2 − n22 ... 0 0 −α2
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
0 0 0 0 ... u2N − r2N u2N 1− αN
0 0 0 0 ... u2N u
2
N − n2N −αN
1− α1 −α1 1− α2 −α2 ... 1− αN −αN 0


qr1
qn1
qr2
qn2
...
qrN
qnN
ξ

=

r11 − u11
n11 − u11
r12 − u12
n12 − u12
...
r1N − u1N
n1N − u1N
0

(35)
The bordered Hessian of the system of firm profit maximization problems is a (2N+1)x(2N+1)
matrix in a bordered block diagonal form. Simplfying it into block matrix form:
Hsys =
A B
C D
 (36)
Where A is the upper left justified 2Nx2N matrix, B is the 2Nx1 matrix in the last column,
C is the 1x2N matrix in the last row, and D is the bottom right most 1x1 matrix which is
equal to zero. The inverse of Hsys is given by:
H−1sys =
A−1 + A−1B(D − CA−1B)−1CA−1 −A1B(D − CA−1B)−1CA−1
−(D − CA−1B)−1CA−1 (D − CA−1B)−1
 (37)
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Notice that A is block diagonal so A−1 is a block diagonal matrix where the subblocks are
the inverse of the 2x2 subblocks of A. Also note that D is zero. This implies that the
bottom left block of A−1 is −(CA−1B)−1CA−1 and the bottom right block is (−CA−1B)−1.
To obtain ξ, only the last row of the inverse must be calculated. Next we derive the terms
that compose the inverse Hessian. Using the no REC trade Hessian from Section A.4.1, we
can show that,
(−CA−1B)−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
1x1
=
−1∑N
i=1
1−αi
|Ui| ((1− αi)(u2i − n2i ) + αiu2i ) + αi|Ui| ((1− αi)u2i + αi(u2i − r2i ))
.
(38)
CA−1 is a matrix of dimension 2Nx1 where the 2x1 submatrix at elements (2k-1, 2k) is given
by,
[(
1−αk
|Uk| (u
2
k − n2k) + αk|Uk|u2k
) (
−1−αk|Uk| u2k −
αk
|Uk|(u
2
k − r2k)
)]
(39)
where |Uk| = (u2k − r2k)(u2k − n2k) − (u2k)2 is the firm’s Hessian when not constrained by an
RPS policy. Let the 2N+1 system of equations be denoted by Hsys x = b. Inverting Hsys, ξ
is given by the following matrix product, noting that the last element of b is zero:
ξ = [−(D − CA−1B)−1CA−1 (D − CA−1B)−1]b
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. Performing the matrix operations yields:
ξ(α1, ..., αN) =
N∑
k=1
1
|Uk| {(r1k − u1k) [(1− αk)(u2k − n2k) + αku2k]− (n1k − u1k) [(1− αk)u2k + αk(u2k − r2k)]}∑N
i=1
1
|Ui| {(1− αi) ((1− αi)(u2i − n2i ) + αiu2i ) + αi ((1− αi)u2i + αi(u2i − r2i ))}
(40)
Before continuing, we bring up two important points. First, recognize that the denomina-
tor of equation (40) can be re-written as
∑N
k=1(CA
−1B)k where (CA−1B)k is the vector
CA−1B where all elements i 6= k are zero. Second, consider the 1 firm system of equilibrium
conditions when REC trade is not allowed,

u21 − r21 u21 1− α1
u21 u
2
1 − n21 −α1
1− α1 −α1 0


qr1
qn1
λ1
 =

r11 − u11
n11 − u11
0
 (41)
Using Cramer’s rule, we can demonstrate that,
λ1 =
1
|H1|
{
(r11 − u11)
[
(1− α1)(u21 − n21) + α1u21
]− (n11 − u11) [(1− α1)u21 + α1(u21 − r21)]}
(42)
where |H1| is the bordered Hessian for the utility’s profit maximization problem when con-
strained by an RPS. Notice that the shadow cost of the firm with no REC trade is equivalent
to the expression inside the sum of the numerator in equation (40), but with |Uk| replaced
by |Hk|. We multiply each term k inside the sum of the numerator in equation (40) by |Hk||Hk|
so that we can form a new term in the sum: |Hk||Uk|λk. Last, recognize that
|Hk|
|Uk| = (CA
−1B)k.
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Therefore using these two points we can determine that,
ξ(α1, ..., αN) =
N∑
k=1
(CA−1B)k λk
N∑
k=1
(CA−1B)k
, (43)
which is a weighted average of the shadow cost of each utility when there is no REC trade.
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